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Abstract: This paper discusses the geopolitical and socioeconomic implications the development of shale gas (& oil) has had in the
US. The approach has been that of placing shale gas under erasure (or sous rature). In other words, the assumption that shale is
currently both present/absent was made to answer the question of whether it can actually be considered as a resource. Moreover, the
success  of  the  “shale  revolution”  in  the  US has  not  only  had  an  impact  on  the  International  Oil  & Gas,  Petrochemical,  natural
resource and renewable markets, but it has also triggered certain geopolitical events which are modifying the role played by nations
globally. Finally, it is suggested that under the prevailing circumstances these unconventional resources appear to still be more of a
challenge  than  part  of  the  solution  to  the  ever  growing  energy  demand,  and  production  of  goods  associated  with  societal
needs/aspirations  worldwide.
Keywords: Energy, Geopolitics, Horizontal drilling, Hydraulic fracturing, Shale.
INTRODUCTION
Every  single  sector  of  modern  society  can  be  held  accountable  for  today’s  energy  crisis.  Nowadays,  our
independence of judgment could be so restricted that even scientific thinking (its constructive-speculative character at
least) has simply become trained thinking. Arguably, this paper aims to be the consequence of total – though partial
may be more realistic – independence of judgment. It would make little sense to dwell upon how we got into this mess
in  the  first  place,  interestingly  enough  every  generation  has  somehow  been  able  to  undermine  and  so  put  off  the
immediacy of the energy crisis since the 1960s (generational stalling has been passed on instead); hence, our concern is
not so much what happened or what will/can happen, but instead what is happening. This paper will address specific
aspects of the so-called “shale gas revolution” that has been taking place in the United States (US). As it often happens
when trying to write about contemporary events, there is none to very little advantage of hindsight, at best this paper
cannibalizes papers and documents being published as the writing was taking place. One way to better understand the
current implications of the “shale gas revolution” is by placing it under erasure, which is to say, by writing about it and
striking through it  to show how necessary and yet inadequate this revolution – as all  revolutions are – looks at the
moment. Consequently, this investigative approach highlights the presence/absence condition of shale that leads to the
question: is shale a resource or not?
According  to  one  of  the  many  International  Energy  Agency  (IEA)  reports  (2014)  over  $1600  billion  is  being
invested  each  year  to  provide  the  world’s  consumers  with  energy  [1].  Interestingly,  this  report  also  says  that
approximately  70% of  said  investment  is  related  to  fossil  fuels  (which  provide  around  80% of  the  world’s  energy
demand), be it for oil, gas or coal extraction, transport to consumers, transformation (e.g. from crude oil to refined oil
products), or the construction of fossil-fuel fired power plants. However, with so many oil fields reaching their maturity,
finding  new and/or  alternative  resources has  become a must. Shale  gas has been  seen as a  possible solution,  albeit
* Address correspondence to this author at the Dipartimento di Ingegneria dell'Ambiente, del Territorio e delle Infrastrutture (DIATI) Politecnico di
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success stories are limited to a handful of basins in the US and Canada where natural gas and oil from shale formations
are produced on a commercial scale even if in aggregate investment is still more  than the earnings [1]. For years, the
technical literature has focused on shale as if they were truly the solution (or to a large extent at least) of our energy
needs. Perhaps a good way to sum up today’s state of misinformation surrounding the “shale gas revolution” would be
by looking at how it is being interpreted/characterized by different sectors of society (namely political, technological
and economical) which, unfortunately, seem always more disconnected from each other. The reader is reminded though
that any worldwide view on shale can only be seen through the lens of the US experience which is ultimately the sole
global reference on the matter thus far.
The Politics of Energy – Non-Geological Considerations
From a political viewpoint, the current US administration is not only enjoying shale gas success (though exploration
and development  started  long  ago)  but  it  is  also  seizing  the  opportunity  to  recast  the  US role  in  the  global  energy
landscape. Not surprisingly the government wants to create ‘Sustainable Shale Gas Growth Zones’ in what seems to be
a strategy to require cross-subsidies from shale gas to renewables as a condition for development (in other words fossil
fuels  would be subsidizing renewables).  Inevitably the question as  whether  shale  gas  is  actually  sustainable  arises.
Otherwise,  why the  cross-subsidies  (or  feebates)?  On a  finite  planet,  such  as  ours,  having  just  one  main  source  of
energy has  meant  a  downward spiral  (even more so since the Industrial  Revolution because development  has  been
largely driven by fossil fuels). The history of energy supply-and-support systems is out of the scope of this paper (on
this subject readers may find useful the first chapters of Jeremy Rifkin’s The Hydrogen Economy), but to fully grasp the
seriousness of the situation some concepts must be made clear and so a short digression is at hand.
For many experts past historical events help define present ones, yet when it comes to the ever confusing “politics
of energy” nothing short of the current state of international affairs, or simply how-are-we-getting-along-today scenario,
can determine the everyday life of the large majority of the world’s population. Politics may be too close to philosophy
for science, but let us not forget from where science stems. Perhaps in an over simplistic – yet logically and critically
thought – manner the following should be kept in mind throughout this paper: energy empowers politics. Consequently,
energy  is  politically  contested,  both  nationally  and  internationally;  and,  as  far  as  energy  supply  is  concerned,  oil
continues  to  be  the  most  vulnerable  to  geopolitical  risks.  To  prove  this  an  account  of  one  of  the  many events  that
developed at the time of writing should suffice.
In October 2014, when oil prices dropped to below US$90 per barrel, oil market participants began to wonder when
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) would step in and cut down production to re-boost
prices back over the US$100 mark. However, a statement by Saudi Oil Ministry spokesman Ibrahim al-Muhanna made
it clear OPEC leader Saudi Arabia was in no rush to scale down production simply because “the high cost of producing
shale oil had put a floor under oil prices” [2]. The production costs of shale oil1 (the new frontier) and shale gas (fields
decline so fast it’s now old news) are high compared with conventional resources because of the capital-intensive nature
of the technology involved, namely hydraulic fracturing (aka fracking) and horizontal drilling. At present, the major
drawback of nearly all unconventional resources is their high production costs. Politically speaking, there seems to be a
shale paradox in the US: can the US actually become energy independent by relying on the output of an unconventional
resource whose very production is so dependent on the fluctuations of oil prices? The two main (opposing) political
parties agree the US should be energy independent, though they disagree on how this can be done realistically. For
instance,  while  one  party  believes  renewable/alternative  energy  to  be  the  answer,  the  other  continues  to  bet  on
(conventional  and/or  unconventional)  fossil  fuels.  Interestingly,  both  resources  are,  and  contrary  to  popular  belief,
intrinsically related.
Though fossil fuels provide cheap energy, as compared to renewables, they also have an arguably greater impact on
the environment (e.g. climate change). Contradictorily, renewables turn out to be expensive because they depend on
fossil fuel for energy. Energy provided by solar panels may have low environmental impact, but not the actual making
of  solar  panels  considering  the  energy  needed  comes  from “burning”  fossil  fuels.  Still,  one  could  ask  whether  the
energy to manufacture the panels could come from other solar panels. Sadly, the fact remains that the payback time of
renewable energy is often measured in decades, but more and more  energy is  needed  every day to move and transform
things. This is a major  conundrum  for most, as  it poses  the  question of  whether  a full  scale  shift from one  form  of
1 The expression “shale oil”, or the more accurate term “tight oil”, is often used to refer to rock formations that contain oil and might sometimes
actually be shale [3].
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energy to another is likely. Think, for instance, that electric cars are a reality, but modern society also requires long-haul
trucks  to  transport  goods  across  countries  (move-and-transform-things  society),  could  they  also  be  powered  by
electricity?  The  “politics  of  energy”  can  be  confusing  precisely  because  of  the  complex  and  seemingly  unrelated
connections between factual and speculative knowledge, small wonder there are so many “energy writers” out there
trying to set records straight. In the US, political debates revolving around energy have ended up caught in the kind of
political rhetoric that masks reality and makes deciding the best choices available a now-it’s-too-late-for-that situation.
What role is shale playing in the current American energy mix? As suggested by OPEC’s (non)reaction to tumbling
crude prices, it would appear that shale has recast the US in the role of “swing producer”. And though this may have
brought back a smile to most folks in Capitol Hill, the situation today is far from that of the Arab-Israeli conflicts of the
1950s and 1960s in which the US’s swing-producer role was government-driven as opposed to price-driven. Of course,
a political smile is not a technical one, here is a reality check: experts say US shale oil production costs are somewhere
in between US$85/bbl to US$110/bbl whereas Saudi crude costs are a meager US$10/bbl, or US$15 at the most [1, 4].
Even shale gas is costly when natural gas prices drop, add fast declining fields (unarguably technology won’t make up
for lesser-quality geology) and uncertain environmental impact to the equation, and the shale revolution is already a
thing of the past [5]. Shale gas and oil do not seem to be a bridge to move energy production away from coal and oil.
From this perspective and under these specific historical circumstances, other than swing producer the US is looking
more like a “wring producer” as it tries to squeeze out every single drop of oil it can just to stay in the game.
Seen from a different angle the above said could also paint an entirely different picture. What if keeping low oil
prices was intended to further  weaken certain world economies? A geopolitical  dispute – though it  would be more
accurate to say a supposedly unpaid gas bill – between Ukraine and Russia (any peace roadmap for the parties involved
will definitely be a rocky one) led to economic sanctions on behalf of Europe and the US to the latter. In this case, a
US$20 oil-price  drop alone might  not  be enough to  make Russian economy stumble,  but  not  being able  to  borrow
money from outside the country would pose a serious threat to economic stability. Some analysts have suggested this
situation would only drive Russia closer to China (allegedly in May 2014 China signed a multi-billion dollar gas deal
with Russia followed by a number of economic agreements [6]). Europe would be significantly affected given its high
dependence on Russian gas. In this case, the US could consider exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe, albeit
all the implied complexities of doing so.
As far as energy supply is concerned, nowadays, Europe and the US consume nearly 50% of net imports of oil
which  means  they  are  susceptible  to  disruptions  in  oil  supply  as  well  as  price  fluctuations  [5].  In  the  US,  the
unanswered question still remains: can shale gas (and oil) be a permanent solution to a temporary problem or, quite the
opposite,  just  a  temporary  solution  of  a  long-lasting  problem?  Europe  is  certainly  skeptical  about  the  shale  gas
revolution in the US (Poland’s failed experiment to extract shale gas has had its toll) and yet it somehow sees with high
hopes going from Russian-gas dependent to American-gas dependent. Geopolitical risks concerning energy supply have
much to do with the paradox that a country’s development is fossil-fueled, somehow reinforcing the idea that a country
is  only  as  strong  as  its  capacity  to  build.  However,  and  much  to  the  regret  of  many,  politics  cannot  fix  geology.
Engineering, on the other hand, has been known for trying to patch it up.
The Technologies Behind the Shale Revolution: A Few Engineering Considerations
It  has  been  argued  that  the  current  success  of  shale  gas  (and  lately  shale  oil)  extraction  is  largely  due  to  the
combination  of  hydraulic  fracturing  and  horizontal  drilling.  The  importance  of  these  technologies  in  shale  gas
production has been corroborated by a large majority of experts; in fact, the American Petroleum Institute (API) states
that the fast rise in production from shale formations in the US “is attributable to significant advances in the use of
horizontal drilling and well stimulation technologies and refinement in the cost-effectiveness of these technologies” and
“hydraulic fracturing is the most significant of these” [7]. It is also true this technology is not new to the oil and gas
industry as the first fracking experiment was performed in 1947 and became commercial by 1950 [8], on the other hand,
horizontal drilling dates back to the first horizontal well in the 1930s and horizontal wells were common by the 1990s
[8, 9]. Sound engineering practice recognizes that fossil fuel extraction could have negative consequences for the local
environment in which it takes place and hence poses risks. Nonetheless, some academic observers have concluded that
if properly carried out, fracking, for instance, may have lower risks than one might think [10]. Recently, Rubinstein and
Mahani [11] have argued that compared with wastewater disposal, fracking is less responsible for inducing earthquakes.
In fact, the evidence shows that out of the tens of thousands of wells which are fracked every year in the US, only a few
dozen are known to have induced felt earthquakes. Paradoxically, both critics and defenders of fracking have valid
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arguments to support their opposing views. This section of the paper,  however, will  look at the technology used to
produce gas (or oil) from shale formations strictly from an engineering viewpoint.
As it is well-known, shale gas falls under the category of unconventional resources along with shale oil, tight gas,
coalbed methane (CBM), heavy oil/tar sands and methane hydrates. Technical papers covering 30 years or more of
shale technology development show that only shale formations with certain characteristics will produce gas [8, 12, 13].
Perhaps the two most distinctive features of shale formations are: 1) the shale acts both as the source and the reservoir
for the natural gas; and 2) shale permeabilities range from 1 to over 100 nanoDarcies, for reference, construction-grade
cement averages about 0.005 mD [8]. (Just picture trying to extract water from an ordinary blackboard and yes the now
old classroom type!). In these places conventional technologies are ineffective and this is where fracking comes in.
Basically, the mechanism involves the use of water pressure to create fractures (or cracks) in the rock to release the oil
and natural gas it contains into wells that have been drilled for collection. In engineering practice, fracking refers to this
specific stimulation activity; in other words, it is limited to the fluid action in initiating and extending cracks in the rock
[8].  Whether  willingly  or  not,  to  the  untrained  eye,  fracking  has  come to  represent  nearly  every  phase  of  the  well
development cycle; i.e., from drilling to production. To a large extent, this situation has (de)generated (into) the many
inaccuracies  surrounding  hydrocarbon  production  from  shale  formations.  Hydraulic  fracturing  technology  was
introduced and developed to help solve an undesirable condition (i.e., low-permeability rocks) or, in other words, to
bridge the gap between what is and what is desired. As it happens with many other technologies, hydraulic fracturing
has been undergoing improvements which have made its application progressively safer, albeit large amounts of water
usage continues to be a problem. In the US, this process (now) takes place under tighter and tighter regulatory control
than when it was first implemented. Small wonder the focus of much of the research carried out today continues to
revolve around the benefits of additional safeguards (popular  wisdom says “you can never be too safe!”). A recent
paper, for instance, has emphatically suggested increasing safeguards when hydraulic fracturing is carried out at shallow
depths (according to the authors less than one mile as far as the US is concerned) to make sure the technology does not
impact drinking water reservoirs [14].
As aforementioned, horizontal drilling is the other technology directly involved in the US shale boom. As opposed
to fracking, horizontal drilling has largely been ignored by the media (it does not seem to induce “earthquake” news!)
and general public, and thus not as negatively targeted as its technological counterpart. It is particularly common in
shale  reservoirs  because  it  allows  significantly  more  wellbore  exposure  to  the  reservoir  rock.  More  specifically,
horizontal drilling is a subset of directional drilling, i.e. the intentional deviation of a wellbore from a vertical path to a
horizontal  trajectory.  Historically  speaking,  the  technology can be traced back to  the  first  US patent  for  the  use of
flexible shafts to rotate drilling bits issued to John Smalley Campbell [15, 16]. However, practical application of the
technology did not truly take place until the early 1980s, when improved downhole drilling motors and the invention of
downhole telemetry equipment made the technology commercially viable [16]. It may be true horizontal drilling lets
producers access far more natural gas from relatively thin shale deposits, nonetheless high drilling rates and associated
costs  play  against  the  technology.  Yet,  it  must  also  be  said  that  over  the  last  decade,  the  cost  difference  between
horizontal  and  vertical  drilling  has  been  narrowing  down.  Consider  that  in  Texas'  Barnett  shale,  the  US’s  most
developed shale play, the number of producing horizontal wells rose from fewer than 400 in 2004 to more than 10,000
during 2010 as reported by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) [17].
In short, hydraulic fracturing coupled with horizontal drilling make it possible to extract and produce natural gas in
places where traditional technologies are ineffective. However, good engineering practice should not only be concerned
with the integration of process and knowledge, in fact it should also address the economics of such integration. This
issue  has  polarized  analysts  and  experts  insofar  as  the  changes  brought  on  by  the  shale  revolution  in  the  US  has
disrupted the existing state of affairs. Contrarians for instance, as analyst and author Bill Powers or geologists Arthur
Berman and David Hughes, already speak of “the popping of the shale gas bubble”. The main argument here is that
shale gas resources and reserves have been exaggerated and highly speculative and today’s level of shale gas production
is unsustainable. On the other hand, there are those, for example Daniel Yergin, who believe that shale gas can lead the
US to the much coveted “energy independence”.
Socioeconomic Implications: The Costs of Revolution
The blessing and the curse of any type of revolution is (often) the irreversible change in the established order. The
US is now producing so much gas that the market has been oversupplied, forcing gas prices sharply downwards, add the
recent steady fall in oil prices and the average American consumer (keep in mind that the word ‘consumer’ nowadays,
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actually stands for ‘oil’ consumer) is now truly convinced the shale revolution is nothing short of a blessing. This may
actually be true, at least for all those who do not work for the oil industry or those who do not have investments in the
oil industry. Those not particularly fond of the oil and gas industry may even rejoice over the imminent gloomy times
ahead, but they should also be aware the situation will have a negative impact on those who work in the renewable
energy industry, or the energy efficiency business and even those addressing climate change. It is hard to accept reality,
especially when it is riddled with contradictions, the likes of the oil and gas industry is a (direct or indirect) sponsor of
renewable energy!
Unquestionably, energy is so central to our modern economy that when its price goes up, every other sector of the
economy  feels  it  and,  whether  we  like  it  or  not,  fossil  fuels  represent  the  primary  source  of  energy  worldwide
(according to the EIA – just in the US – petroleum, natural gas, and coal together provided 87% of total primary energy
during the first decade of the twenty-first century, [18]). These are the cold, hard facts. Needless to say, energy is, and
will continue to be, a corollary of fossil fuels until alternative sources can realistically replace them. To this end, and as
mentioned earlier,  it  has been suggested shale gas and oil could lead the transition into a less fossil-fuel dependent
world. However, opposers have argued that these unconventional resources cannot actually deliver. Much of the debate
revolves  around  the  commerciality  of  shale  production  given  the  lack  of  long-term  production  history  to  validate
estimated ultimate production (EUR) [19]. Recently, Browning et al. [20, 21] published a study on the Barnett Shale
which, among other things, tackles detailed well-by-well analysis of production and calculation of EUR for all wells.
Generally speaking, it could be said that drilling projects should meet acceptable estimated EUR thresholds for a project
to  be  considered  viable  and  profitable.  At  the  time  of  writing,  for  instance,  US  natural  gas  trade  was  below  the
3$/MMBtu (around $2.70/MMBtu) set for the study’s worst-case scenario, which the authors had claimed would be
“unlikely to occur” [17, 18]. While authors could have predicted increasing natural gas supplies in their forecast model,
they  could  not  have  done  so  for  the  relatively  mild  weather  which  brings  us  to  the  problematic  of  virtually  all
forecasting,  i.e.,  their  accuracy.  Up  until  now,  experts  have  addressed  this  particular  issue  without  consensus.
Interestingly, Hawking [22] has recently restated the seemingly obvious (yet too often forgotten), “one can’t predict the
weather more than a few days in advance” from which we can imply that long-term forecasts are rather worthless if one
considers  how  rapidly  their  accuracy  deteriorates  the  longer  out  into  the  future  they  go.  Ideally,  then,  long-term
forecasts should be used more as a way to characterize future risks rather than banish them; hence the focus should not
be on the median projection as much as on the range insofar as range could tell us much more about the nature of the
risks we face [23]. But, what does all this seemingly disconnected narrative actually mean?
Essentially, it means all sides involved have chosen to handpick only the evidence supporting their own previous
opinions and beliefs (aka confirmation bias). Surely, this is not the only mechanism at work, but it is the one largely
responsible for the narrowing of our minds (and let us not forget scientific thinking entails thinking open-mindedly). No
doubt oil and natural gas extraction from shale has increasingly polarized society, even if through an accumulation of
undigested facts. Consider the following (very general) situation: a group of elected officials must determine the course
their country should take in relation to energy policies for the medium-term, to do so they analyze oil & gas production
forecasts provided by “independent” agencies (such as, the EIA or the IEA). And here lies the first of their problems, as
mentioned above forecasts are difficult to handle objectively. A decision-maker’s judgment under the uncertainty of
forecasts may detect patterns where none exist (it is worth noting, however, that research has indicated this tendency
can  be  observed  in  both  experts  and  laypeople  alike  [24]);  hence,  an  overly  optimistic  forecast  could  pose  serious
threats  to  a  country’s  stability  as  actions  taken  on  such  basis  tend  to  undermine  risks.  Conversely,  less  optimistic
forecasts create the kind of panic which leads to rash decisions and regrettable actions. Small wonder both the EIA and
the IEA have begun to constantly review their forecasts in an effort to present more reliable data to policymakers as
well as business and governmental leaders who happen to take these forecasts quite seriously.
Heretofore what can be said about the “shale revolution” is that it is far more of an indicator than of a driver within
the energy mix. But what exactly is it an indicator of? Unarguably, it highlights (for those who have not been paying
attention)  the  fact  that  conventional  resources  are  finite  and  unconventional  ones  (mind  you  finite  too!)  are  much
needed whether to perpetuate our current lifestyles or serve as transition into a completely different order. Moreover,
and regardless of whose side one is on, pro or against the preservation of the status quo,  this “revolution” has also
evinced how the science is being increasingly downplayed by all other factions involved in decision-making processes.
As of late company executives, politicians, investment managers – i.e., the so-called power structures in our society or
bluntly  those  who  are  running  our  lives–  are  finding  factual  information  more  and  more  difficult  to  analyze  and
interpret. In their defense, though, those behind the science have not been as clear – or have somehow been steered to
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ambiguity – as one would want lately. Readers may want to ask themselves this: Can we actually tell what is false from
what is not anymore? How many failures to prove a hypothesis can be found in scientific literature nowadays? Poor
decisions can be made, but they should not be due to misleading information, especially when the stakes are so high.
The ambiguities of today’s decision making can be seen with the recent presidential veto of TransCanada’s Keystone
XL  tar  sands  export  pipeline  project  (running  from  Alberta,  Canada,  to  Cushing,  Oklahoma)  by  the  Obama
administration. In 2013, the same administration had decided to go ahead with the southern leg of this project only to
now ban the northern leg, keep in mind they relied on the exact same data, mostly on environmental grounds. In fact,
many will  argue  the  evidence  provided by  the  US Environmental  Protection  Agency (EPA) in  February  2015 (see
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/20140032.pdf)  was  pivotal,  however,  similar  evidence  had  been  presented  by
independent experts for the project’s southern leg and it was not considered in the same manner. So, if the science had
not changed, what had? Well, everything but. First and foremost, oil prices, from the 100 USD/bbl of 2013 to the 50
USD/bbl of early 2015,  suddenly making a project  of  this  magnitude less attractive.  That  is  to say that  despite our
obsession with it, the science is becoming less and less relevant in decision-making processes.
CONCLUSION
Much to the detriment of the coming generations, we have also been doing very little to clean up the mess passed on
by our forebearers. Ultimately, the presence/absence of shale resources has done nothing more than simply (re)state the
obvious: geopolitical hegemony, economic and social inequality, as well as confirmation and status-quo bias. The truth
of  the  matter  is  that  every  sector  involved  has  indulged  heavily  on  rhetoric  while  being  light  on  data.  One  of  the
questions posed by the US shale revolution has been whether or not the exploitation of such resources could serve as a
‘transitory’ means towards renewable energy sources. Once more, experts remain divided on the subject. On the one
hand, there are those who believe shale resources are the key to US energy independence, and on the other, those who
view them as a mirage on the horizon. From a technical viewpoint, the data can play in favor of either side because even
critical thinking is at the mercy of our perception of facts, perception being the key word here. In recent years, most of
the discussions on the subject have revolved around peer-reviewed research and the attempt to address the facts from a
neutral perspective. But neutral is akin to science whereas not so much to human nature. In fact, keen observation of the
development of shale shows worrisome scientific mood swings, either there’s-nothing-to-worry-about or better-safe-
than-sorry postures.
We are all well aware of the fate that met many species in the geological past (and we are referring to those who
exhausted  the  resources  in  the  habitat  they  lived  in!).  A common place  of  our  self-opinion has  been “it  will  never
happen to us, we are too intelligent” and yet fact-driven thinking would appear to be saying otherwise. Whether shales
become the resources some want them to be, will make little difference in the much larger context of our future on a
finite planet. The real quest will be to make the systematic changes our society desperately needs. For instance, does it
really make sense to foment the ways of the industrialized world in the so-called developing nations on claims that they
would gain so much in terms of education, health care, technology and more? Aren’t these developing nations the very
consequence of the development of the industrialized world? Moreover, has anyone actually asked the people (not the
leaders) of these nations whether they want to live like their wealthier counterparts? Questions like the above are readily
dismissed as nonsensical by the highly educated members of industrialized society, after all who wouldn’t want to live
the industrial dream? Nonetheless, one cannot help but ask: who is the most resilient, who will be best fit to overcome if
we ever reach the dramatic energy shortages some are predicting? Many speak about learning from past mistakes as
they make those very same mistakes over again. Nowadays, a significant number of papers on shales have ‘lessons
learned’ as part of their title, which, in a way, can be interpreted as follows: development of unconventional reservoirs
(specifically of shale gas & oil) in the US has reached a point in which reducing uncertainties is almost at the same level
as that of conventional reservoirs. Needless to say, the situation of these unconventional resources in the rest of the
world is far from being comparable.  Only time, and the markets,  will  tell  whether the chances the US has taken to
develop shale gas and oil will eventually pay off. As far as meeting global energy demand is concerned, it seems rather
certain the situation can only get more and more complex; meaning that for better or for worse the real uncertainty
always lies within us.
As things were (or appeared to be) up to July 2015.
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